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I. Introduction
Imagine you have decided to run for office, to speak out
publicly against an injustice, to enter the job market, or even to
join a new online forum. Now, imagine after starting your chosen
endeavor, you go online to discover that someone who disagrees
with your position posted your personal information on the
internet and called for others to harass you. To make matters
worse, you realize that you cannot determine who posted your
personal data. 1 You have been doxed. 2 Because you cannot identify
the person who posted your information, where can you turn for
recourse? The next logical party is the website where your personal
information was posted. 3 Unfortunately, under current laws online
intermediaries are typically immunized from liability in these
situations. 4 This Note argues that this lack of legal recourse is no
longer acceptable in the internet-dominated modern world.
Doxing (or doxxing) is the act of releasing personal
information on the internet without consent. 5 The motivations for
doxing vary, but this Note focuses on doxing that is done with the
intent to cause harm and the need to provide a remedy to the

1. See infra notes 79–88 and accompanying text (discussing how one can
easily hide their identity online).
2. See infra notes 5–13 and accompanying text (explaining doxing in further
detail).
3. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997)
(describing how a victim of anonymous cyber-harassment attempted,
unsuccessfully, to hold AOL liable).
4. See infra Part III (outlining the broad immunity granted to service
providers under the Communications Decency Act).
5. See Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy
for the Malicious Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451,
2455–56 (2017) (defining doxing). Personal information that is doxed often
includes a home address, an email address, a phone number, a social security
number, the victim’s employer and employer contact information, the victim’s
family members’ contact information, photos of the victim, or photos of the
victim’s children and where they attend school. See id. at 2456 (listing types of
personal information).
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victim. 6 Doxing originated in the 1990s and quickly gained
popularity in the hacking community. 7 Originally, hackers doxed
as a revenge tactic against other hackers. 8 A hacker would dox a
rival—revealing the rival’s identity—to try to open the victim “up
to harassment or even law enforcement action.” 9 More recently,
however, doxing has moved beyond the hacking community and
evolved into a form of cyber-harassment. 10
Doxing is often done anonymously, and it is frequently difficult
to identify the perpetrator—the “doxer”—if they wish to hide their
identity. 11 Doxers typically post a victim’s personal information on
social media sites and other websites that are widely available to
6. See Victoria McIntyre, Note, Do(x) You Really Want to Hurt Me: Adapting
IIED as a Solution to Doxing by Reshaping Intent, 19 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 111, 113 (2016) (“The goal of doxing is to scare and intimidate a
victim . . . .”); Sameer Hinduja, Doxing and Cyberbullying, CYBERBULLYING RES.
CTR., https://cyberbullying.org/doxing-and-cyberbullying (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) (stating doxing is done to seek revenge, to bring attention to someone who
was previously anonymous, or even just for “kicks”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Dylan E. Penza, Note, The Unstoppable Intrusion:
The Unique Effect of Online Harassment and What the United States Can
Ascertain from Other Countries’ Attempts to Prevent It, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 297,
304 (2018) (noting doxing is also used as a form of vigilante justice where a doxer
will “reveal the information of people in order to punish them for perceived
crimes”).
7. See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 114 (explaining the term “dox” is computer
hacker shorthand for documents).
8. See Mat Honan, What is Doxing?, WIRED (Mar. 6, 2014, 1:03 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/03/doxing/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (describing the
origin of doxing as “an old-school revenge tactic that emerged from hacker culture
in [the] 1990s”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. Id.
10. See Nellie Veronika Binder, Note, From the Message Board to the Front
Door: Addressing the Offline Consequences of Race and Gender-Based Doxxing
and Swatting, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2018) (“Doxxers now routinely release
a person’s private information online with the intention of inciting other Internet
users to harass that victim.”); Nellie Bowles, How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream
TIMES
(Aug.
30,
2017),
Tool
in
the
Culture
Wars,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html
(last
visited Sept. 8, 2019) (noting doxing originated in the hacking community, but
recently “doxxing has emerged from subculture websites like 4Chan and Reddit
to become something of a mainstream phenomenon”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
11. See Emma Marshak, Online Harassment: A Legislative Solution, 54
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 505 (2017) (“Half of the victims of online harassment do
not know the perpetrators.”); infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (outlining
how one can mask their identity online).
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the public, such as Wikipedia or Twitter. 12 Once someone is doxed,
anyone with access to the internet can find and use the information
to perpetuate the harassment. 13
Current examples of doxing are all too common. The home
address and phone number of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, the
woman who accused Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh of
sexual assault, were posted on Twitter after she came forward
publicly with her accusations. 14 After being doxed, Dr. Ford
received death threats and other harassing messages, which
ultimately caused her and her family to flee their home. 15
Additionally, during the September 2018 Kavanaugh hearing,
three Republican Senators—Lindsey Graham, Mike Lee, and
Orrin Hatch—were doxed. 16 The Senators’ home addresses and
12. See Binder, supra note 10, at 59–60 (“[B]ecause doxed data remains
online until the harasser or the hosting site removes it, the information continues
to corrode victims’ professional and social reputations long after the initial
harassment occurs.”); see, e.g., McAllister, supra note 5, at 2452 (recounting the
doxing of Brianna Wu, who received rape and death threat tweets that included
photos of her and her husband and their home address).
13. See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 112 (noting once personal information is
doxed, others can use the information and continue to threaten a victim and often
“[i]t is impossible to know who is behind the threats because they are able to hide
behind various accounts on the Internet”).
14. See Jesselyn Cook, A Troll Doxxed Christine Blasey Ford. Twitter Let
Him Back on Its Platform in Hours, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2018, 12:14 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/troll-doxxed-christine-blasey-fordtwitter_us_5ba3ba6ee4b069d5f9d0ce92 (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“[O]thers
retweeted the messages and copied them onto Reddit, further disseminating
Blasey’s contact details.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See id. (explaining how the rapid dissemination of Dr. Ford’s personal
information forced her family to flee their home). Brett Kavanaugh’s wife, Ashley,
received death threats in her government email inbox leading up to the
September 2018 hearing. See William Cummings & Christal Hayes, Death
Threats Target Brett Kavanaugh’s Family, Woman Who Accused Him of Sexual
TODAY
(Sept.
20,
2018,
6:35
PM),
Assault,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/09/20/deaththreats-brett- kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford/1371995002/ (last visited Sept.
8, 2019) (recounting that Kavanaugh’s wife received multiple threatening emails
to her government email) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Because Mrs. Kavanaugh is a Town Manager for the Maryland Village of Chevy
Chase, her work email address is available online and her information was not
doxed. See The Village of Chevy Chase Section 5, VILLAGE OF CHEVY CHASE,
http://www.chevychasesection5.org/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (listing Ashley
Kavanaugh as Town Manager and providing an email address to contact her) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Lukas Mikelionis, Republican Senators Doxxed on Wikipedia by
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personal cell phone numbers were posted on Wikipedia and then
shared on Twitter. 17
Doxing victims also include those not in the public eye.
Numerous college professors have been doxed after discussing
controversial topics. 18 In Washington state in December 2018, a
student secretly filmed his high school teacher’s lecture on the
Swedish YouTube sensation Felix Kjellberg. 19 During his lecture,
the teacher criticized Kjellberg “for promoting racism and
anti-Semitism.” 20 After the student posted the video on Twitter,
followers of Kjellberg made public attempts to gather the teacher’s
name and personal information to dox him. 21
Doxing creates harm offline in the real world because the
personal information posted is accessible to anyone with an
internet connection. 22 Once the personal information is on these
public sites, it is available for anyone to view (and use) and difficult
to remove. 23 Doxing’s harms include harassment, physical harm,
Someone from House of Representatives After Kavanaugh Hearing, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/republican-senators-doxxedon-wikipedia-by-someone-from-house-of-representatives-after-kavanaughhearing (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“The leaking of information occurred
sometime after the three lawmakers questioned Kavanaugh.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See id. (“The intentional publication of the information was first caught
by a Twitter bot that automatically tracks any changes made to the Wikipedia
entries from anyone located in the U.S. Congress and publicizes them on the social
media site.”).
18. See Asia Fields, Secret Video of Teacher Criticizing YouTuber Goes Viral,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 2018, at B1 (“Some professors have lost jobs or become
scared for the safety of their family after being harassed or doxed.”); see also
Bowles, supra note 10 (noting a professor from Arkansas who was doxed in 2017
and wrongly accused of participating in a neo-Nazi march).
19. See Fields, supra note 18, at B1 (discussing that the teacher’s lecture on
fake news criticized Kjellberg).
20. Id.
21. See id. (recounting that “Kjellberg saw the post and retweeted it,” which
led to others also reposting it).
22. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 20 (2014)
(“Harassing posts are situated wherever there are individuals who view them and
thus they have a profound influence over victims’ lives.”); Layla Goldnick, Note,
Coddling the Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation of Revenge Porn
and Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
583, 591 (2015) (articulating how victims of doxing experience real life harms
offline when their personal information is posted).
23. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY
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and financial harm. 24 Doxing victims are also at an increased risk
of identity theft. 25
Doxing tactics also include more severe forms, such as revenge
porn26 or swatting. 27 Revenge porn is the posting of intimate
images of another person without permission. 28 The images are
typically posted with offensive remarks about the person and often
include links to the victim’s social media profiles and to other
personal information. 29 Swatting is a form of cyber-harassment
where someone will call in a false report to authorities that leads
police to dispatch heavily armed tactical units to a victim’s home. 30
States have criminalized swatting; however, because the call to
authorities is typically placed anonymously, the perpetrator often

TECH. L.J. 1103, 1112 (2011) (explaining how even if content is removed from one
website it can “be cached and copied on other websites”); John B. Major, Note,
Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amendment Analysis of
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 124 (2012) (outlining how even if
someone blocks a Twitter user, their posts can still be located in searches).
24. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 10 (stating that the average cost of
cyber-harassment is $1,200 due to legal fees, child care costs, and moving
expenses).
25. See Marshak, supra note 11, at 513 (“Doxxing has an economic impact
both when the victim takes expensive preventative measures and when the
publication of private information is followed by more harassment or threats.”);
Binder, supra note 10, at 59 (providing that doxing often includes encouragement
to cause physical harm to the victim and when a doxer releases social security
numbers or other financial account information, doxing raises the victim’s
potential for identity theft).
26. See Goldnick, supra note 22, at 585 (discussing revenge porn and
explaining how it is becoming more common).
27. See Binder, supra note 10, at 55 (explaining how swatting and doxing are
related).
28. See Goldnick, supra note 22, at 585–86 (defining revenge porn and
discussing the lack of legal recourse for many victims of revenge porn).
29. See id. at 586 (“The most damaging revenge websites actually link the
illicit content to legitimate social networking and media sites like Facebook,
Twitter, and LinkedIn.”).
30. See Binder, supra note 10, at 55 (discussing a Massachusetts
Congresswoman who was a swatting victim after an anonymous caller reported
the Representative’s “home was under attack by an ‘active’ shooter”).
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cannot be identified or prosecuted. 31 Existing federal laws do not
expressly address swatting. 32
Swatting often stems from doxing, 33 and it is inherently
dangerous because both the SWAT team and the victim are
prompted to act based on inaccurate or incomplete information. 34
Swatting has even led to death 35 and the physical injury of victims
caught up in these situations. 36 In addition to endangering both
police and victims, swatting wastes government resources as first
responder teams are deployed to address a non-existent threat. 37
Doxing can cause harm to anyone who incites the wrath of the
cybermob. 38 However, doxing and other forms of cyber-harassment

31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.3 (West 2014) (criminalizing knowingly
making a false report of an emergency); Ryan Grenoble, ‘Swatting’ is Endangering
Lives, Aided in Part by a Legal Loophole, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2019, 3:59
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/deadly-prank-endangering-lives_us_5b17
fca6e4b09578259e132b (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“Tracking down and arresting
a swatter is often a difficult, costly endeavor, requiring investigators to cross local,
state and international borders alike in search of call logs on servers.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. Grenoble, supra note 31.
33. Binder, supra note 10, at 55.
34. See id. at 60 (explaining why swatting is the most extreme form of
doxing); Matthew James Enzweiler, Note, Swatting Political Discourse: A
Domestic Terrorism Threat, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2015) (“The
authorities respond with weapons drawn, expecting a high-risk incident, thereby
creating a dangerous situation for the unsuspecting swatting victim and police
alike.”).
35. See Brett Molina, California Man Pleads Guilty After ‘Swatting’ Call Led
to Kansas Man’s Death, USA TODAY (Nov. 14, 2018, 1:40 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/11/14/man-pleads-guiltycall-duty-hoax-leading-deadly-swatting/1999789002/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)
(describing how a swatting victim was fatally shot by police after a man falsely
reported a hostage situation at the victim’s home) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
36. See Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Swatting: The New Cyberbullying Frontier After
Elonis v. United States, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 455, 457, 471 (2016) (recounting the
swatting of Tyran Dobbs, who was shot twice with rubber bullets, once in the face,
during a swatting incident at his apartment).
37. See Binder, supra note 10, at 60 (outlining how swatting diverts
resources from actual emergencies and wastes taxpayers dollars); Enzweiler,
supra note 34, at 2003 (noting how swatting is expensive because the false threats
mobilize mass responses by authorities).
38. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 21 (“The United States is not alone in
struggling with cyber harassment.”).
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disproportionately affect women. 39 Women of color encounter more
harassment than any other group. 40 Both academic studies and
law enforcement studies support this conclusion. 41 On the other
hand, men are often attacked online for their ideas or actions. 42 In
short, doxing causes real harm and society is slowly starting to
recognize the true cost of this behavior.
Despite growing awareness of doxing’s pernicious
consequences, existing laws do not adequately address either the
underlying behavior or its consequences. 43 Some signs of progress,
however, are emerging. Proposed legislation in the U.S. House of
Representatives—the Online Safety Modernization Act of 2017
(Online Safety Act) 44—would provide for federal criminal and civil
liability for doxing. 45 This bill is a step forward, but it does not
address the lack of legal recourse for a victim if the person posting
the information cannot be identified. 46 This Note aims to explain

39. See id. at 13 (“Of the 3,393 individuals reporting cyber harassment to
WHOA [Working to Halt Online Abuse] from 2000 to 2011, 72.5 percent were
female and 22.5 percent were male (5 percent were unknown).”); Binder, supra
note 10, at 61 (“Online harassers routinely objectify women on their physical
appearances, and doxxing is regularly accompanied by threats of sexual
violence.”).
40. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 14 (“Nonwhite females face cyber
harassment more than any other group, with 53 percent reporting having been
harassed online.”).
41. See id. (“The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics report found that
seventy-four percent of individuals who were stalked on- or offline were female,
and twenty-six percent were male.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive
Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (2009)
(“Grappling with the trivialization of cyber gender harassment is a crucial step to
understanding and combating the harm that it inflicts.”).
42. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 15 (“When men face cyber harassment,
their experience often resonates with the abuse faced by women.”).
43. See Binder, supra note 10, at 56 (explaining current laws do not
adequately address doxing or swatting); Lipton, supra note 23, at 1106 (“The
prevalence of this conduct suggests that more effective means are necessary to
redress online wrongs and to protect victims’ reputations, but action against
cyber-abusers has posed significant challenges for the legal system.”).
44. H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017).
45. See id. (proposing to amend the federal criminal code for doxing and
swatting).
46. See Binder, supra note 10, at 63 (“Harassers can post destructive content
anonymously, and often evade law enforcement officials by exploiting
location-obstructing technology and jurisdictional boundaries.”).
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why it is appropriate, and necessary, to hold online intermediaries
secondarily liable when the doxer cannot be identified.
For the purposes of this Note, an online intermediary is a
company that facilitates access to the internet. 47 The phrase is
broad and encompasses internet service providers, search engines,
and social media platforms. 48 Throughout this Note, the
unidentified doxer will be referred to as the “ghost doxer” and the
target of the doxing will be referred to as the “victim.”
This Note contends in Parts II–III that the standards of
conduct to which the public holds online intermediaries have
changed since the internet developed in the early 1990s. As a
result, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) 49—which
offers broad immunity to online intermediaries for content posted
by third-parties—should be amended to address the harm caused
by doxing. The doxing CDA amendment could parallel the 2018
sex-trafficking CDA amendment and allow an online intermediary
to be potentially liable if violations of the new federal law on doxing
and ghost doxing occur on their site. 50
Part IV argues that copyright law can provide a model for
legislation to impose secondary liability on online intermediaries
for ghost doxing. Under copyright law, secondary liability is broken
into two categories—contributory liability and vicarious liability. 51
Therefore, the ghost doxing liability scheme could have two
components. First, online intermediaries that encourage doxing
could be held liable under a contributory liability theory. 52 Under
47. See KARINE PERSET, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES 9 (2010) (stating internet intermediaries “facilitate transactions
between
third
parties
on
the
internet”),
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf.
48. Frequently Asked Questions on Internet Intermediary Liability, ASS’N
FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMS., https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/apc%E2%80%99sfrequently-asked-questions-internet-intermed (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (listing
types of internet intermediaries such as network operators, internet access
providers, internet service providers, hosting providers, search engines, social
networks, and other blogs or websites with comment sections) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
49. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
50. See infra Part III.B (delineating this Note’s proposed doxing § 230
amendment).
51. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
434– 35 (1984) (discussing copyright law’s secondary liability scheme).
52. See infra Part IV (outlining copyright’s secondary liability scheme and
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copyright law, contributory copyright infringement occurs when
one intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement. 53
Second, for websites where non-inducement doxing occurs, online
intermediaries could be held vicariously liable in instances where
notice is given and the online intermediary fails to remove the
doxing content. 54 Vicarious liability in copyright can be imposed
when one has “the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.” 55
This Note argues the doxing notice and takedown provision could
be modeled off the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 56
which provides safe harbor provisions for internet service
providers who remove copyright infringing material following
written notice. 57 Overall, this Note proposes a ghost doxing
liability scheme—modeled off copyright law’s secondary liability
theories —be added into the proposed federal bill on doxing.
II. Times Have Changed for Online Intermediaries
The internet is no longer a new frontier that should be afforded
Wild West status. 58 New laws are needed because today’s internet
is far more pervasive and has a completely different configuration
than the internet when it was first developed. 59 First, the number
arguing how it can be applied to doxing).
53. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
930 (2005) (describing contributory copyright infringement).
54. See infra Part IV (explaining how copyright law’s secondary liability
scheme can be applied to doxing).
55. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
56. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1332, 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (providing various safe harbors from indirect
copyright infringement for internet service providers who comply with the
statute).
58. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 79, 102 (arguing the notion of the Wild
West internet is “based on a false set of assumptions”).
59. See id. at 102 (“Just as harm in the workplace and home have profound
social consequences, so too does harassment in networked spaces.”); Marshak,
supra note 11, at 504 (“Online threats and harassment are a growing problem as
life moves online, and the current set of state laws, which were mostly developed
in the 1990s, generally lack the vocabulary and framework to address criminal
behavior that occurs in cyberspace rather than physical space.”).
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of people with consistent internet access in the 1990s was a
fraction of what it is now. 60 Second, blogs and other online
are
the
epicenter
of
discussion
boards—which
cyber-harassment—did not even exist in the mid-1990s. 61 Third,
many of the behemoth online companies that currently dominate
the online marketplace, such as Facebook, did not exist in the
1990s. 62
Today, more than one billion people use Facebook daily. 63 The
reach and influence of companies such as Facebook was
unimaginable in the mid-1990s. 64 Congress is just beginning to
discuss the need to address the issues created by the reach of these
companies. 65 The April 2018 congressional hearing with
Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg supports the contention that the
standard to which the public holds online intermediaries is
tightening. 66 During the hearing, Senator Chuck Grassley stated,
“[t]he tech industry has an obligation to respond to widespread and
growing concerns over data privacy and security and to restore the
60. See Reuben Fischer-Baum, What ‘Tech World’ Did You Grow Up In?,
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/MCV5-EKZF (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) (noting that in 1996 seventy-five percent of American households had no
internet) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization
of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 390 (2009) (“[T]he Internet
was structured very differently in 1996, and the opportunities for anonymous
harassment of women outside of community structures were far fewer, as blogs
and online discussion boards as currently structured did not exist.”).
62. See Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/?
ref=page_internal (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (stating Facebook was founded on
February 4, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data:
Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the U.S. S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Senator John
Thune) [hereinafter Facebook Comm. Hearing] (“More than 2 billion people use
Facebook every month 1.4 billion people use it every day; more than the
population of any country on Earth except China, and more than four times the
population
of
the
United
States.”),http://www.astridonline.it/static/upload/zuck/zuckerberg_senate-hearing-transcript_10_04_18.pdf.
64. Id.
65. See id. (statement of Senator Bill Nelson) (“And, if Facebook and other
online companies will not or cannot fix the privacy invasions, then we are going
to have to—we, the Congress.”).
66. See id. (statement of Senator John Thune) (“We want to hear more,
without delay, about what Facebook and other companies plan to do to take
greater responsibility for what happens on their platforms.”).
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public’s trust. The status quo no longer works.” 67 These hearings
are strong evidence that society is starting to demand that online
intermediaries be held to a higher standard than they were in the
early days of the internet. 68
A. Proposed Federal Doxing Legislation—Online Safety
Modernization Act of 2017
Members of Congress are starting to recognize the need to
address cyber-harassment (such as doxing) through specific
legislation. 69 The proposed Online Safety Act bill addresses both
criminal and civil liability. 70 Doxing would be a criminal violation:
Whoever uses the mail or any facility or means of interstate or
foreign commerce, to knowingly publish a person’s personally
identifiable information—(1) with the intent to threaten,
intimidate, or harass any person, incite or facilitate the
commission of a crime of violence against any person, or place any
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury; or
(2) with the intent that the information will be used to threaten,
intimidate, or harass any person, incite or facilitate the
commission of a crime of violence against any person, or place any
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both. 71

67. Id. (statement of Senator Chuck Grassley).
68. See id. (statement of Senator John Thune) (“In the past, many of my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle have been willing to defer to tech companies’
efforts to regulate themselves, but this may be changing.”); see also Jaffe, supra
note 36, at 467 (discussing how “the reasonable standard may change in favor of
the broadcaster to cast a wider security net over the channels being used”).
69. See H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017) (listing the sponsor of the
proposed federal doxing bill as Representative Katherine Clark from
Massachusetts and indicating co-sponsors, including representatives from
Indiana, California, Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee).
70. See id. (proposing the section “Interstate Doxxing Prevention” which
would amend 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-880 to hold a doxer criminally liable and provide
a civil cause of action to a victim).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
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Further, Title II of the bill proposes criminal and civil liability
for swatting. 72 The bill also directs the Department of Justice to
develop a strategy to reduce, investigate, and prosecute
cybercrimes against individuals, and to publish statistics on
cybercrimes against individuals. 73
Massachusetts Representative Katherine Clark, the sponsor
of the Online Safety Act, is one of Congress’s most avid anti-doxing
advocates. 74 The Congresswoman was even a swatting victim
herself in 2016. 75 Representative Clark has introduced multiple
bills that address swatting and other forms of cyber-harassment. 76
Unfortunately, none of these proposed bills have been passed into
law. 77 On the whole, these proposed bills on doxing and swatting
acknowledge the growing need for doxing victims to have legal
recourse. The various proposed doxing bills, however, do not
address individuals victimized by ghost doxers. 78
B. Anonymity on the Internet
The problem of the ghost doxer is common and should not be
ignored. 79 Today, anonymity on the internet can be achieved with
72. See id. (proposing criminal liability for anyone who “knowingly
transmit[s] false or misleading information that would reasonably be expected to
cause an emergency response” in the absence of circumstances reasonably
requiring an emergency response).
73. See id. (“The Attorney General shall develop a national strategy to
reduce the incidence of cybercrimes against individuals . . . .”).
74. See Lisa Bei Li, Note, Data Privacy in the Cyber Age: Recommendations
for Regulating Doxing and Swatting, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 325 (2018)
(discussing Representative Clark’s various anti-doxing proposals).
75. See Press Release, Katherine Clark, U.S. Representative for the 5th
District of Massachusetts, Congresswoman Katherine Clark Target of Swatting
Hoax (Feb. 3, 2016) (explaining on the evening of January 31, 2016 the police
received an anonymous call claiming there was an active shooter at
Representative Clark’s home) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. See Li, supra note 74, at 325 (stating Representative Clark sponsored
multiple bills to combat cyber-harassment).
77. See id. (noting none of the proposed bills on doxing or swatting have been
enacted by Congress yet).
78. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 221–24 (indicating that online harassers
cannot be prosecuted if the individual cannot be identified).
79. See Lipton, supra note 23, at 1114 (“The anonymity provided by the
Internet may increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may encourage
individuals who would not engage in such conduct offline to do so in the
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relative ease. 80 For example, Tor is an internet network that allows
its users to remain anonymous online by hiding their IP
addresses. 81 To make matters worse, ghost doxers are more likely
to be bolder and tend to go further than when their identity is
known. 82 While in some instances a victim can obtain a court order
to identify a ghost doxer, these “John Doe” subpoenas are often
difficult to obtain. 83 A court will issue a John Doe subpoena only
after the victim navigates the procedural requirements and makes
the necessary showing required by the authorizing law or rule. 84
anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet—people are less inhibited
when faced with a computer terminal . . . .”); Marshak, supra note 11, at 523
(proposing legislation on doxing and noting “that even anonymous communication
is criminalized [in the proposed legislation] so that future developments in related
laws, such as those governing the statute of protective orders, will be easily
transferred to this statute”); Binder, supra note 10, at 63 (noting harassers often
post anonymously and use technology to avoid being identified).
80. See Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud
Should Be Regulated, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 592 n.74 (2002) (explaining that one’s
online identity can be concealed through the use of “anonymous emails,
short-lived Web-sites, and falsified domain name registrations”); Michael
Froomkin, “PETs Must Be on a Leash”: How U.S. Law (and Industry Practice)
Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable Privacy Enhancing Technology, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 986 (2013) (discussing how Internet Protocol (IP) numbers can
be masked to conceal one’s identity); Kristine Gallardo, Note, Taming the Internet
Pitchfork Mob: Online Public Shaming, the Viral Media Age, and the
Communications Decency Act, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 721, 729 (2017) (“[T]he
existence of an IP address alone, without additional identifying information,
cannot pinpoint the absolute identity of an online poster.”).
81. See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 114 (“Doxbin, a Tor site used to host files
containing the personal information of individuals and certain groups of people,
PROJECT,
was
launched
in
2011.”);
Tor
FAQ,
TOR
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WhatIsTor (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) (“Tor is a program you can run on your computer . . . [i]t protects you by
bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays . . . it
prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from learning what sites
you visit . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. See Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009
UTAH L. REV. 993, 1009 [hereinafter Web Site Proprietorship] (“Anonymity also
reduces accountability and accuracy.”); Gallardo, supra note 80, at 728 (“[I]t is
much easier to criticize someone’s actions when you can do so anonymously.”).
83. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 223 (“Courts protect the identity of
anonymous posts from frivolous lawsuits by setting forth a series of requirements
before granting these [John Doe] subpoenas.”).
84. See Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent
Legal Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 325 (2008) (noting how the standard courts
use for John Doe subpoenas is varied).

REACHING THROUGH THE GHOST DOXER

1321

Overall, it is relatively easy for a doxer to shield their identity
online if they have a desire to do so. 85 Anonymity online, however,
has many benefits. 86 For example, anonymity online can allow
those dealing with sensitive issues—such as domestic violence
survivors seeking support—to receive assistance that they
otherwise might not obtain. 87 Therefore, this Note does not argue
that anonymity online should be discouraged or that anonymous
online speech is detrimental. Rather, this Note argues that the
laws surrounding the discourse on the internet must be updated to
reflect the modern reality of cyber-crimes and cyber-harassment
such as doxing. 88
C. Privacy and First Amendment Concerns with Regulating
Doxing
Doxing inherently implicates both an individual’s privacy and
free speech. 89 Free speech advocates sometimes express concern
about regulating cyber-harassment because of the potential
chilling effect on free speech. 90 A full discussion of the potential
85. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 55 (recounting a blogger experiencing
cyber-harassment who was unable to identify her harassers even with the
assistance of a paid forensic computer expert); Binder, supra note 10, at 71
(“Moreover, the anonymity of the web makes it difficult for victims to know who
is attacking them, and the lack of legal repercussions for unmasked harassers has
only emboldened doxxers and swatters.”); Russell Brandom, Finding Fuboy: One
Man Spent Four Years and $35,000 to Unmask His Internet Troll, VERGE (Nov.
23, 2018, 8:50 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/11/23/9772824/commenterdefamation-lawsuit-identity-revealed (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (examining the
story of a politician in Illinois who sought to identify the person who had
compared him to Jerry Sandusky online) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
86. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 60–61 (explaining anonymity online has
many benefits, such as support for marginalized groups).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 20 (stating cyber-harassment is a major issue that needs to be
addressed).
89. See id. at 190 (arguing a legal regime governing cyber-harassment would
not necessarily “undermine our commitment to free speech”); MacAllister, supra
note 5, at 2462 (noting how as technology evolves notions of privacy also evolve).
90. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 191 (“Many resist the regulation of the
online speech as antithetical to our commitment to public discourse because the
Internet is the ‘equivalent of the public square.’”); Lipton, supra note 23, at 1128
(discussing how the First Amendment is implicated when attempting to regulate
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First Amendment challenges to doxing legislation is outside the
scope of this Note. However, it is important to momentarily discuss
the competing doctrines of privacy and free speech because speech
on the internet can have a global reach almost instantly and a
lasting effect. 91
Justice Louis Brandeis stated that “the right to be let alone
[is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.” 92 Privacy consists of two main constitutional
values: “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters” and “the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions.” 93 Doxing uniquely implicates both of
these values, as many times the doxed content will follow the
victim online for an extended period of time. 94 Privacy interests,
however, must be balanced by free speech considerations. 95
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 96 First Amendment
jurisprudence rests on the idea that “the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 97 The Supreme Court
articulated in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union98 that online
speech is awarded the same First Amendment protection as offline
speech. 99 The right to free speech, however, is not absolute and
some categories of speech are not protected. 100
cyber-harassment).
91. See Gallardo, supra note 80, at 728 (stating an estimated 3.2 billion
people have access to the internet).
92. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
93. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 762 (1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 589–600 (1977)).
94. See MacAllister, supra note 5, at 2462 (explaining how online content can
often remain viewable for a long time).
95. See id. (“The right to privacy is not absolute . . . .”).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
97. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
98. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
99. See id. at 870 (discussing the internet, the Supreme Court stated “[w]e
agree . . . that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium”).
100. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
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Regulating doxing illuminates the tension between privacy
and free speech. In Cohen v. California, 101 the Supreme Court
stated the ability to regulate speech depends on whether
“substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner.” 102 Doxing is arguably invading a substantial
individual privacy interest in an intolerable manner because of the
harm doxing causes offline. 103
Further, conduct, unlike speech, is not under First
Amendment protection. 104 Focusing on the conduct aspect could
reduce or avoid First Amendment concerns for doxing. 105 Overall,
attempts to regulate online speech will likely be met with First
Amendment challenges. 106 Congress (hopefully) can draft a statute
for doxing that mitigates potential First Amendment challenges. 107
III. Amending the Communications Decency Act for Doxing
Congress’s careful drafting of a federal law on doxing should
be done in conjunction with an amendment to the Communications
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”). Threats are also not constitutionally
protected. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003) (explaining the First
Amendment permits Congress or a state to ban a “true threat”); see also Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (stating political hyperbole is not a true
threat).
101. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
102. Id. at 21.
103. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text (describing the offline
harm doxing causes).
104. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1996) (“We cannot accept
the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea.”); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Cohen’s absurd and
immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little speech.”).
105. See Li, supra note 74, at 320 (arguing the best way to mitigate First
Amendment issues with regulating doxing and swatting is to focus on the conduct
aspect of both).
106. See MacAllister, supra note 5, at 2463 (explaining likely First
Amendment challenges to doxing will be that the statute is void for vagueness
and overly broad).
107. Cf. Lipton, supra note 23, at 1128 (“In the physical world, statutes have
successfully criminalized offline analogs to many of today’s online wrongs. There
is no reason why judges cannot continue to draw lines between protected and
prohibited speech in the online context.”).
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Decency Act (CDA) of 1996. 108 The CDA, also referred to as § 230,
was originally enacted when the internet was still in its infancy to
allow for the development of the new medium. 109 Specifically, the
CDA was enacted in part as a response to Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services Co. 110 Stratton Oakmont was a New York state
court case that found Prodigy, a computer network with two
million subscribers, liable for an anonymous defamatory message
posted on one of its online bulletin boards—“Money Talk.” 111 The
court found that Prodigy was a publisher—and subject to
defamation liability—because it filtered some offensive content
from its site. 112
Under the reasoning of Stratton Oakmont, interactive
computer services could escape liability if they never removed
offensive content, but they would be subject to liability if they ever
removed offensive content. 113 In enacting the CDA, “Congress
sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the
creation of content” and thus avoid penalizing online
intermediaries for removing offensive material. 114 Further, the
CDA is particularly powerful because it preempts any state or local
Specifically,
laws
that
are
inconsistent
with
it. 115
108. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
109. See id. § 230(a) (noting the Congressional finding that “[t]he Internet and
other interactive computer services have flourished to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation”).
110. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see Zeran
v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing how Congress
passed CDA § 230 in part as a response to Stratton Oakmont and aimed to
encourage interactive computer services to “self-regulate the dissemination of
offensive material over their services”); Goldnick, supra note 22, at 599
(explaining Congress passed CDA in response to Stratton Oakmont).
111. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1–2 (describing how the
defendant’s website functioned).
112. See id. at *10 (“[T]his Court is compelled to conclude that for the purposes
of plaintiff’s’ claims in this action, Prodigy is a publisher . . . .”).
113. Cf. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2008) (discussing how Congress in passing the CDA sought to overturn
Stratton Oakmont).
114. Id.
115. See § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”);
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding Yahoo! was
immune from liability under CDA § 230(c)(1) for an Oregon state law negligent
undertaking claim when the company did not remove the offensive content
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§ 230(c)—Protection for “Good Samaritan” Blocking and Screening
of Offensive Material—states “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” 116 Thus, an online intermediary enjoys
immunity unless it crosses the line from service provider to content
provider. 117
A. Lessons from Zeran v. American Online and Barnes v. Yahoo!
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 118—an early ghost doxing
case 119—was instrumental in extending broad § 230 immunity to
internet service providers. 120 The plaintiff Ken Zeran was wrongly
associated with many offensive anonymous posts about the
Oklahoma City Bombing. 121 The anonymous posts, which began
within a week of the bombing, advertised the sale of shirts and
other merchandise “featuring offensive and tasteless slogans
related to the bombing.” 122 The advertisements included Zeran’s
home phone number and instructed viewers to call Zeran
regarding the merchandise. 123 The anonymous poster continued to
advertise additional merchandise online, and “interested buyers
Barnes’ former boyfriend posted on their site); see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“[G]iven § 230(c)(1) it cannot sue the messenger just because the messenger
reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”).
116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
117. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100–01 (“[S]ubsection (c)(1) only protects from
liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer services (2) whom a
plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker
(3) of information provided by another information content provider.”); Goldnick,
supra note 22, at 601–02 (articulating the difference between an internet service
provider and an online content provider).
118. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
119. See id. at 329 (outlining that the plaintiff’s claim against AOL was based
on a series of anonymous postings).
120. See Bartow, supra note 61, at 390 (stating Zeran was the instrumental
case in establishing internet service provider (ISP) immunity under § 230).
121. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (providing that the Oklahoma City Bombing
took place on April 19, 1995).
122. Id.
123. See id. (explaining Zeran could not change his home phone number
because he ran his business out of his house).

1326

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307 (2019)

were told to call Zeran’s phone number.” 124 Due to these posts,
Zeran received numerous angry and threatening calls, including
death threats. 125 Zeran contacted AOL and requested that they
remove the posts. 126 Ultimately, Zeran sued AOL for the
defamatory speech on its platform posted by an unknown third
party. 127 The Fourth Circuit found that AOL fit squarely within
§ 230 and was therefore immune. 128 Zeran had no other recourse
as he could not identify his ghost doxer. 129
Additionally, one of the most concerning aspects of § 230 is
that online intermediaries continue to enjoy immunity even after
a victim notifies them of doxed content and requests its removal. 130
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 131 provides a striking example. In 2004,
Cecilia Barnes ended a relationship with her boyfriend. 132 He
responded by posting nude photos of Barnes on various Yahoo!
profiles without her permission. 133 The profiles also “included the
addresses, real and electronic, and the telephone number at
Barnes’ place of employment.” 134 Barnes’s ex-boyfriend also posted
in online chat rooms and directed male correspondents to the
124. Id.
125. See id. (“By April 30, Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call
approximately every two minutes.”).
126. See id. (“The parties dispute the date that AOL removed this original
posting from its bulletin board.”).
127. See id. at 330 (noting that AOL raised § 230 as an affirmative defense).
128. See id. at 332 (“AOL falls squarely within this traditional definition of a
publisher and, therefore is clearly protected by § 230’s immunity.”).
129. See id. at 329 n.1 (quoting Zeran’s statement that AOL “made it
impossible to identify the original party by failing to maintain adequate records
of its users”); DAVID J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 152 (2007) (“He couldn’t track down the anonymous
person who posted the T-shirt ads. He couldn’t sue AOL. He had no way to fight
back.”).
130. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009)
(granting § 230 immunity to Yahoo! even following requests to take down the
specific fraudulent profiles of the plaintiff); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997) (detailing that the plaintiff notified AOL of the
defamatory content).
131. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
132. See id. at 1098 (explaining the doxing of Barnes).
133. See id. (discussing that Barnes did not know the nude photographs of her
had been taken).
134. Id.
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profiles he created. 135 Shortly following this, Barnes began to
receive unsolicited emails, phone calls, and visits from men—all
with the expectation of sex. 136 Barnes contacted Yahoo! and asked
the site to remove the profiles, but the company failed to take any
action. 137 Yahoo! eventually promised they would take the profiles
offline, but never actually acted until after Barnes filed suit in
Oregon state court. 138 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that § 230 immunized Yahoo! despite the company’s
awareness of the profiles. 139 Online intermediaries should not
continue to be permitted to hide behind § 230’s broad immunity
today if they are made aware of specific doxing content. 140
B. Why the CDA’s Broad Immunity is No Longer Appropriate
In addition to stories such as Cecilia Barnes and Ken Zeran,
there are a number of reasons why the CDA should be amended to
permit lawsuits against online intermediaries. First, one of the
main rationales for the CDA, the self-regulation of the internet,
has not played out in practice. 141 Second, Congress amended § 230
135. See id. (describing how Barnes’ ex-boyfriend continued to post to draw
attention to the profiles he created).
136. See id. (stating numerous men sent Barnes unsolicited messages
indicating they expected to have sexual relations with her).
137. See id. (“One month later, Yahoo! had not responded but the undesired
advances from unknown men continued; Barnes again asked Yahoo! by mail to
remove the profiles.”).
138. See id. at 1099 (noting Barnes filed suit after approximately two months
of not hearing from Yahoo!).
139. See id. at 1105 (“To summarize, we hold that section 230(c) bars Barnes’
claim, under Oregon law, for negligent provision of services that Yahoo undertook
to provide.”). It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit found Yahoo! could
potentially be liable under the contract theory of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1109.
The court ruled that Barnes could have potentially a breach of contract claim
based on an estoppel theory because Yahoo! promised to remove the profiles and
Barnes had relied on that promise. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, did not rule
on the existence of a contract regarding this claim. Id.
140. See infra Part III.B (explaining why and how the CDA should be
amended for doxing).
141. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating Congress enacted the CDA “to promote the free exchange of
information and ideas of the internet and to encourage monitoring for offensive
or obscene material”).
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last year to limit the immunity of websites that facilitate sex
trafficking. 142 Third, a growing number of commentators have
proposed amending § 230 for various types of cyber-harassment
due to the evolution and growth of the internet since 1996. 143
First, the self-regulation of the internet has not played out in
practice as Congress envisioned in 1996. 144 Websites that
142. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2012) (providing “[n]othing in this section,
other than subsection (c)(2)(A) shall be construed to impair or limit” sex
trafficking law); H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(l), at 3 (2018) (explaining the amendment
is “designed to combat online sex trafficking by providing new tools to law
enforcement . . . by making it easier for states to prosecute criminal actor
websites by amending section 230 of the Communications Decency Act”);
Facebook Comm. Hearing, supra note 63 (statement of Senator John Thune)
(noting how Congress passed the sex trafficking amendment “in overwhelming
bipartisan fashion”); Jeffrey Neuburger, FOSTA Signed into Law, Amends CDA
Section 230 to Allow Enforcement Against Online Providers for Knowingly
Facilitating
Sex
Trafficking,
PROSKAUER,
https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/04/11/fosta-signed-into-law-amendscda-section-230-to-allow-enforcement-against-online-providers-for-knowinglyfacilitating-sex-trafficking/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [hereinafter FOSTA Signed
into Law] (discussing how the FOSTA amendment aims to encourage online
providers to “exercise greater responsibility over sex-trafficking related content”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 177–81 (proposing an amendment to limit
immunity under § 230 to exclude “[web]sites that encourage cyberstalking or
nonconsensual pornography and make money from its removal or that principally
host cyber stalking or nonconsensual pornography”); Derek Bambauer, Exposed,
98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2028–29 (2014) (outlining various scholars’ proposed
amendments to CDA § 230 to limit the immunity granted to online
intermediaries); Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS J.
383, 383 (2012) [hereinafter Website Design and Liability] (arguing for amending
§ 230, but creating safe harbors for “website operators that: (1) permit only
postings by identified posters; (2) have nonprofit status and do not accept ad
revenue; and (3) remove postings upon request of the victim”); Goldnick, supra
note 22, at 602–04, 626 (explaining various scholarly proposals for amending CDA
§ 230 and arguing the CDA should be amended for websites that “encourage the
posting of illegal or tortious content or contribute materially to illegal or tortious
conduct are not afforded immunity”); see also Web Site Proprietorship, supra note
82, at 999, 1034 (arguing imposing proprietorship liability on web site sponsors
through anti-cyber-harassment policy “is consistent with section 230, as it holds
the Web site sponsor accountable for its own actions or omissions”); see generally
Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230
is Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against
Internet Service Providers, 8 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2008).
144. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 171 (“Courts have roundly immunized site
operators from liability even though they knew or should have known that
user-generated content contained defamation, privacy invasions, intentional
inflictions of emotional distress, and civil rights violations.”).
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knowingly host cyber stalking or revenge porn are likely protected
under § 230 and are far from the “Good Samaritans” Congress
meant to protect when it drafted the CDA. 145 Further, many
websites (such as Twitter) technically have policies that prohibit
doxing. 146 Twitter, however, is notorious for not enforcing its own
policies. 147 The ideal of internet self-regulation is not the current
reality. 148 The actual reality necessitates a change in the existing
internet regulatory scheme. 149
Second, Congress already recognized the need to update the
CDA by passing its 2018 amendment to limit immunity for sites
that facilitate sex trafficking. 150 The amendment limits the
immunity provided by § 230 “for online services that knowingly
host third-party content that promotes or facilitates sex
trafficking.” 151 While this amendment is narrow, Congress’s
willingness to amend the CDA demonstrates the heightened

145. See id. at 173 (“Courts have repeatedly found that generalized knowledge
of criminal activity on a site does not suffice to transform a site operator into a
co-developer or co-creator of the illegal content.”).
146. See
About
Private
Information
on
Twitter,
TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/personal-information (last visited
Sept. 8, 2019) (“Twitter Rules: You may not publish or post other people’s private
information without their express authorization and permission.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
147. See Cook, supra note 14 (articulating Twitter is “notoriously bad at
addressing” issues such as doxing even though such practices are against its
policies).
148. See Facebook Comm. Hearing, supra note 63 (statement of Senator John
Thune) (“In the past, many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have been
willing to defer to tech companies’ efforts to regulate themselves, but this may be
changing.”).
149. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 22, at 177 (stating the CDA should be
amended for “sites that encourage cyber stalking or non-consensual pornography
and make money from its removal or that principally host cyber talking or
nonconsensual pornography”); but see Gallardo, supra note 80, at 721 (arguing
the CDA empowers web hosts to implement policies that can help curb online
public shaming).
150. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(l), at 3 (2018) (explaining the amendment is
“designed to combat online sex trafficking by providing new tools to law
enforcement . . . by making it easier for states to prosecute criminal actor
websites”).
151. See FOSTA Signed into Law, supra note 142 (describing how the
amendment encourages online providers to “exercise greater responsibility over
sex-trafficking related content”).
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standards for online intermediaries in today’s internet
environment. 152
Third, numerous commentators have urged Congress to
amend the CDA to address the growing problem of
cyber-harassment. 153 Further, some have suggested the DMCA’s
takedown notice provisions could provide a model for a § 230
amendment. 154 These takedown notice provisions provide a safe
harbor for internet service providers who remove copyright
infringing material following written notice of that infringing
content. 155
This Note, in contrast to these other proposals, advocates for
an amendment to the CDA to permit lability for online
intermediaries under a new federal cause of action for doxing. 156
152. See id. (“[W]ithout a doubt the law represents a small crack in the CDA
legal shield that had been undisturbed by Congress since it was passed in 1996.”).
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the various
proposals to amend § 230).
154. See Daniel J. Solove, Speech, Privacy, and Reputation on the Internet, in
THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 15, 26 (Saul
Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (proposing a CDA amendment with
a DMCA-like takedown notice provision for defamation and privacy claims);
Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility: Lessons
from the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237,
239 (2007) (explaining that the DMCA can provide a model for an amendment to
CDA § 230 for online defamation); Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and
Webpages: Creating a Legal Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. &
TECH. L. REP. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing the DMCA’s takedown notice provision in
DMCA Title II provides a model for an amendment to CDA § 230 to address the
hosting of non-consensual pornographic videos or images); Bradley A. Areheart,
Regulating Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 41 (2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/regulating-cyberbulliesthrough-notice-based-liability (articulating how some tortious cyberbullying
could be regulated by amending the CDA with a DMCA-like notice and takedown
provision); cf. Website Design and Liability, supra note 143, at 418 (proposing a
“response-and-identification safe harbor” under which a “website operator may
notify the poster and the poster may elect to stand by the posting by identifying
herself. The posting would then become an ‘identified’ posting and the website
operator would be immune from civil liability”); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H.
Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 409 (2005) (suggesting
ISP reform that “implements the DMCA’s safeguards against bad-faith or
frivolous takedown requests”).
155. See Ronneburger, supra note 154, at 24–28 (explaining the DMCA’s
takedown notice).
156. Cf. id. at 30 (arguing for an amendment to the CDA covering only
revenge porn that is similar to the DMCA takedown notice provision, but not
proposing any specific liability scheme in connection with the notice requirement).
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The doxing amendment to the CDA should be modeled off the 2018
sex trafficking amendment. 157 Following the sex trafficking
amendment, the doxing amendment could exclude from § 230
immunity violations of a new federal law on doxing that would
cover both doxing and ghost doxing. 158
Specifically, the doxing legislation should consist of three
parts. First, a section that is similar to the proposed Online Safety
Act. 159 Second, a section for websites that encourage or otherwise
induce doxing that bases liability on a theory similar to copyright
law’s liability theory. 160 Third, the legislation should contain a
section covering non-inducement doxing that could premise
liability under a theory similar to copyright law’s vicarious liability
theory. 161 For this third section, online intermediaries could only
be held liable if they received proper notice of doxing content and
failed to remove it. 162 Overall, amending § 230 is a crucial first step
157. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (2012)
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be
construed to impair or limit—(A) any claim in a civil action brought
under section 1959 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim
constitutes a violation of 1591 of that title; (B) any charge in a criminal
prosecution brought under state law if the conduct underlying the
charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 of Title 18; or (C)
any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the
conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section
2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal
in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s promotion or facilitation of
prostitution was targeted.
See also CITRON, supra note 22, at 177 (outlining a § 230 amendment that mirrors
the existing federal criminal law and intellectual property exemptions).
158. Cf. Patrick J. Carome & Ari Holtzblatt, Congress Enacts Law Creating a
Sex Trafficking Exception from the Immunity Provided By Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, WILMERHALE, https://www.wilmerhale.com/
en/insights/client-alerts/2018-04-16-congress-enacts-law-creating-a-sextrafficking-exception-from-the-immunity-provided-by-section-230-of-thecommunications-decency-act (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (explaining the sex
trafficking amendment excludes “from its [§ 230’s] protection certain conduct that
would constitute either a violation of federal sex trafficking laws or a criminal
violation of the new federal criminal prostitution law”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017) (proposing criminal and civil
liability for doxing).
160. See infra Part IV.
161. See infra Part IV.
162. See infra Part IV; see also CITRON, supra note 22, at 178 (articulating
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to imposing liability on online intermediaries for doxing.
IV. An Analogy to Copyright Law’s Secondary Liability Scheme
Once the § 230 immunity for online intermediaries excludes
doxing, then one can determine the appropriate type of liability to
impose. Copyright law provides a model for legislation to impose
secondary liability on online intermediaries for ghost doxing. 163
The Copyright Act of 1976 164 does not address secondary liability,
but the common law of copyright allows for secondary liability. 165
In copyright law there are two ways one can be held secondarily
liable for copyright infringement: contributory infringement and
vicarious infringement. 166 Contributory infringement occurs “by
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement.” 167 Put
another way, “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” 168
Second, one “infringes vicariously by profiting from direct
infringement” without stopping or limiting the direct
infringement. 169 Vicarious liability was initially premised on

that her proposed § 230 amendment on nonconsensual pornography could also
potentially include a safe harbor notice provision).
163. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 121–22 (noting copyright law can provide
some recourse for cyber-harassment victims).
164. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012).
165. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435
(1984) (“[T]he concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the
broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one
individual accountable for the actions of another.”).
166. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
929–30 (2005) (explaining secondary liability for infringement may be the only
practical alternative when “it may be impossible to enforce the rights in the
protected work effectively against all direct infringers”).
167. Id. at 930.
168. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating the defendant knew that copyrighted works
were performed at their association’s venue and that “neither the local association
nor the performing artists would secure a copyright license”).
169. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (describing vicarious liability in
copyright).
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agency law’s respondeat superior doctrine, 170 but “even in the
absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be
vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities.” 171 Thus, vicarious liability in copyright sometimes
applies even when the entity lacks actual knowledge of the
wrongful conduct. 172
Just as copyright law provides two types of secondary
liability, online intermediaries should be subject to two types of
secondary liability for ghost doxing. First, online intermediaries
that encourage or induce doxing should be held liable under
reasoning similar to copyright’s contributory infringement
theory. 173 Second, online intermediaries that are not actively
inducing or encouraging doxing should be held vicariously liable
for ghost doxing if they fail to remove the doxed content after
proper notice. 174
A. Copyright’s Secondary Liability Caselaw
The leading Supreme Court cases on secondary liability for
copyright infringement are Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios 175 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. 176
170. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (discussing how vicarious liability was
originally premised on agency law).
171. See id. (arguing that in some instances the imposition of vicarious
liability is appropriate).
172. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d
Cir. 1963)
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and
direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted
materials—even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright
monopoly is being impaired—the purpose of copyright law may be best
effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that
exploitation.
173. See infra Part IV.A–B (explaining copyright law’s secondary liability
scheme).
174. See infra Part IV.A–B (describing how a notice provision is necessary to
impose secondary liability in some instances).
175. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
176. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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In Sony, the Supreme Court considered imposing a claim of
indirect infringement 177 based on the mere distribution of Betamax
video tape recorders by Sony. 178 Universal Studios and Disney
Productions owned the copyrights on many of the television
programs that were taped by purchasers of Sony’s Betamax
recorders. 179 The purchasers creating the illegal copies were the
“direct infringers,” but the Court found Sony did not influence or
encourage any of the illegal copies. 180 The Court reasoned “[i]f
vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this case, it
must rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use
that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material.” 181 The Supreme Court explained that the imposition of
vicarious liability here—which was akin to strict liability for the
end user conduct—was inappropriate. 182
The Supreme Court then turned to the claim of contributory
infringement. 183 It reasoned that “[t]he sale of other articles of
commerce, [did] not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.” 184
Instead, the product need only “be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.” 185 Since the Betamax videotape technology
was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses, 186
177. “Indirect infringement” is an umbrella term for secondary liability for
copyright infringement.
178. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438
(1984) (discussing that the district court found that Sony did not induce any of
the copies in question to be made).
179. See id. at 419, 421 (explaining Universal Studios and Walt Disney owned
the copyrights for many motion pictures and other audiovisual works).
180. See id. at 438 (articulating the district court’s finding that Sony did not
have “either direct involvement with the allegedly infringing activity or direct
contact with purchasers of Betamax who recorded copyright works off-the-air”).
181. Id. at 439.
182. See id. (“There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition
of vicarious liability on such a theory.”).
183. See id. (discussing how contributory liability in copyright law and patent
law differ).
184. Id. at 442.
185. Id.
186. See Peter Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
941, 942 (2007) (noting the commercially significant non-infringing uses in Sony
were “time-shifting and the recording of public domain programming and
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Sony was thus not liable for contributory infringement. 187
Over twenty years later, the Court was again confronted
with the issue of secondary liability for copyright infringement. In
Grokster, various copyright holders—songwriters, music
publishers, and motion picture studios (including MGM)—sued
two peer-to-peer file sharing software distributors, StreamCast
and Grokster (“Grokster”), for infringement. 188 The software
functioned through decentralized peer-to-peer networks, which
prevented Grokster from identifying which files were copied or
when they were copied. 189 Evidence obtained in discovery,
however, revealed that Grokster was aware that users primarily
used its software to illegally download copyrighted files, and that
Grokster intended and encouraged such uses. 190 MGM alleged that
the software distributors “knowingly and intentionally distributed
their software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works in
violation of the Copyright Act,” and sought damages and injunctive
relief. 191
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held “that one who distributes
a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright,
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for resulting acts of infringement by
third parties.” 192 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrow
reading of Sony, 193 which suggested “that whenever a product is
copyrighted broadcasts”).
187. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (“Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general
public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent’s copyrights.”).
188. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
919–20 (2005) (stating the software in question allows users to share files directly
with one another without going through a central server).
189. See id. (describing how Grokster’s software allows users to share
electronic files through peer-to-peer networks).
190. See id. at 922 (discussing that MGM commissioned a systematic search
and found that ninety percent of files available for download were copyrighted
works).
191. Id. at 921.
192. See id. at 937 (“The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful
promise.”).
193. See id. at 934 (explaining Sony “was never meant to foreclose rules of
fault-based liability derived from the common law”).
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capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held
contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of it.” 194 In the
Court’s review, Sony does not “require courts to ignore evidence of
intent if there is such evidence [of inducement], and the case was
never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from
the common law.” 195 The Supreme Court, however, took pains to
make clear that Grokster did not overturn Sony. 196 Rather,
Grokster underscored the importance of examining evidence of
inducement when it is present, even if the product is capable of
substantially non-infringing uses. 197
B. Toward a Theory of Secondary Liability for Ghost Doxing
Copyright provides a useful secondary liability scheme that
can be applied to ghost doxing. 198 First, online intermediaries that
encourage doxing should be held liable under a contributory
liability theory similar to copyright law. Second, online
intermediaries that have non-inducement doxing on their site
should be liable under a vicarious liability theory if they are given
notice and fail to remove the content.
1. Contributory Liability for Encouraging Doxing
Similar to copyright law, online intermediaries could be held
secondarily liable when they intentionally induce or encourage
doxing. Just as Sony was not liable for infringement by users when
its product had substantially non-infringing uses, it would be bad
policy to hold online intermediaries liable for doxing when they do
194. Id.
195. See id. at 934–35 (noting Sony does not require courts to ignore evidence
of inducement because a product is capable of substantial non-infringing use).
196. See id. at 934 (stating the Supreme Court intended “to leave further
consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required”).
197. See id. at 937 (“We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from
trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies
with lawful and unlawful potential.”).
198. See supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text (proposing copyright law’s
secondary liability scheme as a useful analogy for doxing); see also CITRON, supra
note 22, at 121–22 (articulating copyright law could potentially provide recourse
for cyber-harassment victims).
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no more than provide discussion forums. 199 However, online
intermediaries that encourage posting of personal information by
ghost doxers or those that make victims pay for removing such
information should be subject to contributory liability. 200 For
example, various revenge porn websites advertise that they will
remove content for a fee. 201 These types of websites encourage
doxing and other forms of cyber-harassment and should be held
liable for the doxing they encourage. 202 Encouragement could
mean advertising for doxing or otherwise attempting to persuade
third parties to dox. 203 Similar to the reasoning used in Grokster, a
website that is encouraging doxing— even if it is capable of
substantial non-doxing uses—could be held contributorily liable if
there is evidence of doxing encouragement. 204 This secondary
liability should be imposed even without a notice requirement if
the online intermediary is encouraging the doxing.

199. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984) (stating Sony’s tape recorder product was capable of substantial
non-infringing uses).
200. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 175 (discussing extortion sites that
advertise for revenge porn and other damaging information, such as mug shots,
and then turn around and profit from the removal of such content); Goldnick,
supra note 22, at 627 (arguing the CDA could be amended for “ISPs and website
operators/hosts who purposely proliferate or encourage the proliferation of
revenge porn”).
201. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 174 (outlining various revenge porn
websites, gossip websites, and even mug shot removal websites that advertise a
removal or takedown service for specified content for a fee). It is unclear if these
types of websites have immunity under § 230 currently. See id. at 175 (“It is
unclear whether Section 230’s immunity extends to sites that effectively engage
in extortion by encouraging the posting of sensitive private information and
profiting from its removal.”).
202. See id. at 175 (describing various websites that encourage different forms
of cyber-harassment); Bartow, supra note 61, at 391–92 (stating that the entities
who market themselves as able to assist those whose reputations have been
attacked online have incentives to “oppose legal reforms that might enable online
defamation and harassment victims to seek recourse”).
203. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913,
927 (2005) (“StreamCast not only rejected another company’s offer of help to
monitor infringement . . . but blocked the Internet Protocol address of entities it
believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its networks.”).
204. Cf. id. at 934–35 (articulating that even if a product is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, that does not mean a court must ignore evidence
of inducement if it is present).
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At least one circuit found an online service provider
potentially liable for contributing to illegal conduct. 205 In Fair
Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 206 the Ninth Circuit denied
§ 230 immunity to Roommates.com, an online roommate matching
website, because the site “materially contributed” to the alleged
violations of the Fair Housing Act and applicable state laws
through the questionnaires the company required users to fill
out. 207 The Ninth Circuit found that “Roommates’s work in
developing the discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers
and discriminatory search mechanism [was] directly related to the
alleged illegality of the site.” 208 Similar to how Roommates.com
could be held secondarily liable if it encouraged illegal
discriminatory housing practices, 209 sites that encourage doxing
should be held secondarily liable for doxing.

205. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008) (explaining because “Roommate created the questions and choice of
answers, and designed its website registration process around them” the website
was an “information content provider” for these questions, which allegedly
violated the Fair Housing Act and state laws), rev’d on other grounds, 666 F.3d
1216 (9th Cir. 2012) (vacating the district court’s judgment for plaintiff on remand
because “Roommates’ prompting, sorting and publishing of information to
facilitate selection is not forbidden by” the applicable laws); Gallardo, supra note
80, at 738 (discussing the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s Roommates.com case
on § 230 immunity); but see Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755
F.3d 398, 401–03 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating how the Sixth Circuit said that an
encouragement test was not the correct test for determining whether a website
was eligible for immunity under CDA § 230).
206. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
207. See id. at 1167–71 (finding an internet service provider that designed a
website intended to solicit and enforce allegedly illegal housing preferences
“materially contributed” to illegality and therefore was not entitled to immunity
under § 230). The Ninth Circuit did find that the operator was entitled to
immunity for the “Additional Comments” section of the website. See id. at 1174
(describing the “Additional Comments” section of the website as a “generic prompt
[that] does not make [the site] a developer of the information posted”).
208. See id. at 1172 (“Roommate is directly involved with developing and
enforcing a system that subjects subscribers to allegedly discriminatory housing
practices.”).
209. Contra Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th
Cir. 2012) (articulating that on remand that the Ninth Circuit ultimately found
Roommate not liable because the “prompting, sorting and publishing of
information to facilitate roommate selection is not forbidden by the FHA” or the
applicable state housing law).
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2. Vicarious Liability for Non-Inducement Doxing
For online intermediaries not actively encouraging doxing,
vicarious liability is more appropriate. Vicarious liability is
arguably the more widely applicable form of secondary liability
because online intermediaries do, typically, have the right and
ability to control what is posted on their sites and have a financial
interest in such activities. 210 While online intermediaries do have
the right and ability to control what is posted on their sites, that
does not mean it is reasonable to expect them to “police” the
internet for harms created by others using their platform. 211
Therefore, when there is non-induced doxing activity on a website,
an online intermediary should be held secondarily liable if it fails
to remove doxing content after receiving proper notice. 212
3. How the DMCA’s Notice Provision Can Be Applied to Ghost
Doxing
Copyright law, through the DMCA, provides a useful
framework for a notice and takedown provision that can be applied
to doxing. 213 The DMCA provides safe harbors for online service
providers that insulate them from copyright liability if they comply
with the statutory provisions. 214 The safe harbor provisions of the
DMCA reflect the idea that an online service provider “cannot be
held liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material.” 215 Following this same logic, DMCA § 512(c)’s takedown
210. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 180 (explaining in some situations it is in
the interest of a website to keep up material that attracts viewers and advertising
revenue).
211. See SOLOVE, supra note 129, at 152 (discussing how it is unrealistic for
online intermediaries to police all the content on their sites).
212. See infra Part IV.B.3 (arguing the DMCA can provide a model for a
parallel anti-doxing notice and takedown provision).
213. See supra notes 153–155, 161–162 and accompanying text (describing
how the DMCA could be used as a model for a cyber-harassment regulatory notice
provision).
214. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012) (outlining the four safe harbor
provisions for service providers).
215. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006,
1021 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
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notice provision provides an excellent model for a notice
requirement that could be applied to an online intermediary with
ghost doxing on its site.
Under the DMCA, a service provider must meet certain
threshold criteria to qualify for the safe harbor provisions. 216 First,
the party must be a “service provider,” as defined in the statute. 217
Second, a party must satisfy “conditions of eligibility.” 218
Conditions of eligibility for service providers include: enforcing a
“repeat infringer” policy that terminates subscribers and account
holders who repeatedly infringe copyrights 219 and not interfering
with technical measures “used by copyright owners to identify or
protect copyrighted works.” 220 Third, a service provider must
designate an agent publicly to receive notice of alleged
infringements. 221
A qualified service provider must also meet the criteria
outlined within the specific safe harbor provision. 222 Under
§ 512(c)(1), safe harbor from secondary liability for infringement is
only available if the service provider:
•

Does not have actual knowledge of infringing
material, 223

1021 (9th Cir. 2001)).
216. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012)
(discussing the threshold requirements for service providers to qualify for DMCA
safe harbor).
217. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(b) (defining service provider as “a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor”).
218. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A) (listing conditions of eligibility).
219. Id.
220. See id. §§ 512(i)(1)(B), 512(i)(2) (articulating conditions of eligibility and
defining standard technical measures).
221. See id. § 512(c)(2) (stating information about an agent should include at
least their name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address and must
be made available publicly).
222. See id. § 512(a)–(d) (outlining the four safe harbor provisions for service
providers). Subsection (l) states a failure to qualify for a limitation of liability
under this section does not affect the consideration of a defense by the service
provider that they did not engage in infringing conduct. Id. § 512(l); see also
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27 (discussing how each of the four DMCA safe harbor
provisions have slightly different criteria).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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o Does not have “red flag” knowledge, 224 or
o Upon obtaining knowledge or “red flag”
knowledge acts to remove or disable
access to the notified material; 225
•

“Does not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity” when “the
service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity;” 226 and

•

When proper notice of infringing material is given,
the service provider removes or disables access to
the material in a timely manner. 227

Courts have distinguished between actual knowledge 228 and
so-called “red flag” knowledge. 229
Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 230 is a key case
that applies § 512(c)’s safe harbor provision. 231 The plaintiffs in
Viacom alleged direct and secondary copyright infringement
“based on the public performance, display, and reproduction of
approximately 79,000 audiovisual ‘clips’ that appeared on the
YouTube website between 2005 and 2008.” 232 The defendant
YouTube argued it was within the safe harbor. 233 The Second
Circuit held that for a service provider to have actual knowledge
or so-called “red flag” knowledge, it must be aware of “specific and
224. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
225. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
226. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B); see also Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (explaining the benefit
and control provision requires more than the ability to remove or block material,
but also acknowledging “something more” is difficult to define).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
228. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
229. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19,
31 (2d Cir. 2012) (clarifying the nuances of actual knowledge and red flag
knowledge in § 512(c)); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC,
718 F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining the § 512(c) safe harbor provisions
for actual knowledge and red flag knowledge both require the service provider to
know of instances of infringing conduct).
230. 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
231. See id. at 26 (concluding the “§ 512(c) safe harbor requires knowledge or
awareness of specific infringing activity”).
232. Id. The clips included Bud Light commercials and Premier League
games. Id. at 33–34.
233. See id. at 26 (discussing whether YouTube was within the § 512(c) safe
harbor).
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identifiable infringing activity.” 234 The court vacated the summary
judgment order in favor of YouTube “because a reasonable jury
could find that YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of
specific infringing activity on its website.” 235 If the relevant
decision makers at YouTube did in fact have that knowledge, then
that knowledge triggered an obligation for the site to remove the
infringing material in a timely manner. 236 On remand, however,
the court found the safe harbor applied and granted YouTube’s
motion for summary judgment. 237
The DMCA’s takedown notice requirement should be applied
to doxing. 238 Under the DMCA, the takedown notice must be
written and provided to the service provider’s designated agent. 239
The notice must include a signature of the person authorized to act
on behalf of the copyright owner; identification of the infringed
copyright work or works; enough information to allow the service
provider to contact the complaining party; a statement that the
notification is accurate under penalty of perjury and that the
complainant is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner;
and that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the
material being complained about is not an authorized use. 240 If
proper takedown notice is provided, the service provider is
required to “act expeditiously” to remove the material. 241 This
takedown notice provision is used often. For example, Google has
234. Id.
235. Id. Emails between relevant YouTube decision makers discussed specific
infringing content, such as Premier League games and Bud Light commercials,
that allegedly remained on the site following the email discussions. Id. at 33–34.
236. See id. at 27–28 (articulating that once knowledge is established, the
service provider must then timely remove the infringing content).
237. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (conveying YouTube was within the § 512(c) safe harbor).
238. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012) (listing the elements of proper notice and
explaining what a service provider must do if given proper notice).
239. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A) (providing details on the takedown notice
provision).
240. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (detailing the requirements of a proper
takedown notice under the DMCA).
241. Id. § 512(c); see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27–28
(2d Cir. 2012) (“[A]ctual knowledge of infringing material, awareness of facts or
circumstances that make infringing activity apparent, or receipt of a takedown
notice will each trigger an obligation to expeditiously remove the infringing
material.”).
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a tracking service—Google Transparency Report—that provides
an ongoing tally of URLs for which the site has received takedown
notice notifications. 242
A vicarious liability scheme coupled with a notice provision
could provide the outline of a ghost doxing liability statute for
non-inducement doxing. Specifically, the ghost doxing notice and
takedown provision could parallel the DMCA § 512(c). 243 The ghost
doxing provision should require online intermediaries to designate
an agent to receive notice of doxing content. 244 The takedown notice
specifics in § 512(c)(3) should also be used as a model as they
provide specific instructions for notifying an intermediary of
doxing content. 245
Experience has shown that it is unrealistic to assume that
online intermediaries will unilaterally police the internet to
prevent doxing. 246 Thus, this Note does not propose legislation that
places an affirmative duty on online intermediaries to seek out and
eliminate instances of doxing. 247 Further, the DMCA’s good faith
belief component would also be crucial to incorporate into a
parallel anti-doxing notice and takedown provision. Requiring a
good faith belief by the complainant that the content posting
constitutes doxing will help prevent complaints by those who
simply disagree with the content of the reported post. 248 Overall, a
242. See
Transparency
Report,
GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview?hl=en (last visited
Sept. 8, 2019) (listing the number of URLs submitted for delisting as of September
8, 2019 at 4,243,160,549) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
243. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (requiring notice and timely takedown for a
service provider to be within the safe harbor provision).
244. See id. § 512(c)(2) (noting a designated agent’s contact information must
be publicly available).
245. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (outlining the requirements for DMCA
takedown notice).
246. See Rustad & Keonig, supra note 154, at 351 (“ISPs currently have no
duty to police the Internet or to develop technologies to track down off-shore
posters of objectionable materials.”).
247. Cf. § 512(m) (stating the applicability of § 512(a)–(d) is not conditioned
on “a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts
indicating infringing activity”).
248. See CITRON, supra note 22, at 179 (explaining the “heckler’s veto”
concept, which says that “people will complain about speech because they dislike
the speakers or object to their views, not because they have suffered actual
harm”).

1344

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307 (2019)

notice provision similar to DMCA will provide the online
intermediary an opportunity to remove the doxing content in a
timely manner and be immunized if they comply.
V. Conclusion
Doxing is a growing problem that causes harm in the real
“offline” world. The law needs to be updated to address modern
harms like doxing. The outdated blanket immunity of the CDA
§ 230 should be narrowed to be more in line with the realities of
today’s internet and allow online intermediaries to potentially be
held liable in limited circumstances for doxing. To adequately
address doxing, however, amending the CDA is not enough.
Congress also needs to pass legislation that directly addresses both
doxing and ghost doxing. Specifically, Congress should pass
legislation similar to the proposed Online Safety Act, but also
amend that legislation to include two new sections that address
ghost doxing.
To address ghost doxing, copyright law provides a persuasive
analogy for imposing secondary liability on online intermediaries.
Online intermediaries that intentionally induce or encourage
doxing should be held secondarily liable under a contributory
theory that is similar to contributory infringement under copyright
law. Vicarious liability, however, is a more appropriate type of
secondary liability for an online intermediary that is not actively
inducing doxing. An online intermediary should not be held
vicariously liable unless it was given proper notice of the doxing
content and failed to remove it. Society should no longer allow
online intermediaries to avoid liability for the legitimate harms
done by doxing.

